T1027.013 — Encrypted/Encoded File
Tactic: Stealth · Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and…
Sub-technique of Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
title: "T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File"
id: 76df68d4-f32f-40a8-bd4c-dcf69e3b5370
description: 'Encrypted or Encoded File Payload Detection Strategy. Detects use of certutil for encode/decode operations and PowerShell encoded-command/Base64-decode execution, both common LOLBin patterns for delivering or unpacking encrypted/encoded file content on disk. (Data Component: Process Creation; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: Image, CommandLine, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-24
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027.013
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection_certutil_codec:
Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-decode'
- '-encode'
- '-decodehex'
selection_encoded_powershell:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-EncodedCommand'
- '-enc '
- 'FromBase64String'
selection_cab_expand:
Image|endswith:
- '\makecab.exe'
- '\expand.exe'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: (1 of selection_*) and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Legitimate certificate management via certutil; administrative PowerShell scripts using Base64 for data transport; software packaging using makecab/expand.
- System and service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) performing the same action are excluded via filter_system_account; tune further with process/path allowlists if noise remains.
level: medium
T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
title: "T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File"
id: c3dd31d7-fa72-4d15-a0ab-93c3e5657af5
description: 'Encrypted or Encoded File Payload Detection Strategy. Added coverage for base64 encode/decode invocations alongside openssl enc, since the technique description explicitly names simple encoding schemes (base64) as an equally common obfuscation method the prior version could not catch. Also added a context filter requiring the target/output path to be a non-standard staging directory (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp), reducing the high noise from routine admin-script base64/openssl use acknowledged in the falsepositives note. (Retargeted to the process_creation auditd telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: UserContext, ProcessLineage, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-28
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027.013
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_openssl:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/openssl'
a1: 'enc'
selection_base64:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/base64'
selection_staging_dir:
- a1|contains:
- '/tmp/'
- '/dev/shm/'
- '/var/tmp/'
- a2|contains:
- '/tmp/'
- '/dev/shm/'
- '/var/tmp/'
condition: (selection_openssl or selection_base64) and selection_staging_dir
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators and scripts routinely use openssl enc or base64 for backups, certificate handling, or data-at-rest encryption unrelated to malware staging, particularly when operating within /tmp for legitimate temporary processing.
level: medium
T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
title: "T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File"
id: bede37b9-b087-4845-9a86-4b98dc4c424c
description: 'Encrypted or Encoded File Payload Detection Strategy. (Retargeted to the process_creation macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: ScriptContent, ExecutionChain, UserContext.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-06-03
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027.013
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/openssl'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'enc'
- '-d'
selection_gpg:
Image|endswith: '/gpg'
CommandLine|contains: '--decrypt'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of openssl or gpg for decrypting configuration files or backups by administrators.
level: medium
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