T1056.003 — Web Portal Capture
Tactics: Collection, Credential Access · Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. This variation…
Sub-technique of Input Capture (T1056).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
title: "T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture"
id: 23d519e0-6d29-408f-a0e5-7424f7abb545
description: 'Detection of credential harvesting via web portal modification, scoped to web-root/login-page directories and server-side script extensions. (Data Component: File Creation; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: FilePath, ProcessName.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-27
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1056.003
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID: '11'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
- '\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\'
- '\Exchange Server\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\'
- '\Exchange Server\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\aspnet_client\'
- '\ADFS\'
- '\Citrix\'
- '\wwwroot\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.aspx'
- '.asp'
- '.php'
- '.jsp'
- '.js'
- '.dll'
- '.config'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Legitimate web application deployments, patches, or updates writing files into the same web-root directories; System and service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) performing routine maintenance are excluded via filter_system_account; tune further with process/path allowlists if noise remains.
level: medium
T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
title: "T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture"
id: bb3c04f6-92e2-4a89-986e-6a35d4c581aa
description: 'Detection of Credential Harvesting via Web Portal Modification. (Retargeted to file-integrity monitoring of the actual externally-facing web application/portal source and reverse-proxy configuration, rather than unrelated PAM authentication config, which is what the technique actually describes tampering with.) Tune using: MonitoredFilePaths, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-03-19
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1056.003
logsource:
category: file_change
product: linux
detection:
selection_webroot:
type: PATH
name|contains:
- '/var/www/'
- '/usr/share/nginx/html/'
- '/srv/http/'
selection_proxyconf:
type: PATH
name|contains:
- '/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/'
- '/etc/nginx/conf.d/'
- '/etc/httpd/conf.d/'
- '/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/'
selection_nametype:
nametype:
- NORMAL
- CREATE
filter_pkgmgr:
exe|endswith:
- '/dpkg'
- '/rpm'
- '/apt'
- '/apt-get'
- '/yum'
- '/dnf'
condition: (selection_webroot or selection_proxyconf) and selection_nametype and not filter_pkgmgr
falsepositives:
- Legitimate application deployments (CI/CD pushes), package-manager-driven updates to default web pages, and admin edits to reverse-proxy configuration will also match; scope MonitoredFilePaths to the specific portal's login handler files for higher fidelity.
level: medium
T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
title: "T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture"
id: 8b1ee466-2376-4cb9-8b56-a5dadf7d3c58
description: 'Detection of Credential Harvesting via Web Portal Modification. (Retargeted to the file_change macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: WebRootPath, AnomalousProcess.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-01-23
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1056.003
logsource:
category: file_change
product: macos
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '/Library/WebServer/Documents/'
- '/usr/local/var/www/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Normal web development or CMS updates to hosted content, since anomalous process attribution for the modifying process cannot be reliably distinguished from unified log file_change fields alone.
level: high
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