T1078.001 — Default Accounts
Tactics: Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access · Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also…
Sub-technique of Valid Accounts (T1078).
Sigma detection rules (5)
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
title: "T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts"
id: 6bcad60f-b548-4c2e-a799-a6b0c2b49a2b
description: 'Detection of Default Account Abuse Across Platforms. (Data Component: Logon Session Creation; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: UserContext, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-16
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- '4624'
- '4648'
selection_default_account:
TargetUserName:
- 'Administrator'
- 'Guest'
- 'DefaultAccount'
- 'WDAGUtilityAccount'
- 'root'
- 'admin'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and selection_default_account and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Break-glass or emergency use of built-in Administrator/Guest accounts by authorized IT staff during outages; tune UserContext allowlists for approved break-glass procedures.
level: medium
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
title: "T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts"
id: de9e39c3-8534-411e-96cb-3113d6bae6a1
description: 'Detection of Default Account Abuse Across Platforms. (Retargeted to the process_creation auditd telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: SSHMethod, RemoteIPWhitelist.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-02
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.001
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
type: USER_LOGIN
res: success
selection_default:
type: USER_LOGIN
acct|contains:
- 'root'
- 'admin'
- 'ubuntu'
- 'pi'
- 'ec2-user'
condition: selection and selection_default
falsepositives:
- Cloud image default accounts (ubuntu, ec2-user) are used legitimately by provisioning tooling on first boot; scope to logins occurring well after the expected first-boot bootstrap window.
level: high
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
title: "T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts"
id: 905435c0-db65-48e7-a7d5-5fe275dd005d
description: 'Detection of Default Account Abuse Across Platforms. (Retargeted to the cloudtrail AWS telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: AccountList, GeoLocation.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-05
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.001
logsource:
category: cloudtrail
product: aws
detection:
selection:
eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
userIdentity.type: 'Root'
responseElements.ConsoleLogin: 'Success'
filter_mfa:
additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
condition: selection and not filter_mfa
falsepositives:
- Root logins should be exceedingly rare in a well-governed account, so any match without MFA warrants immediate investigation and false positives are limited to break-glass emergency access procedures.
level: critical
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
title: "T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts"
id: 3d474c7e-16e8-4a40-a964-49238c9deb1e
description: 'Detection of Default Account Abuse Across Platforms. (Data Component: User Account Authentication; baseline tier: fallback.) Tune using: Username, InterfaceType.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-04-11
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.001
logsource:
product: networkdevice
service: syslog
detection:
selection_default_user:
Message|contains:
- 'Login Success'
- 'Authentication OK'
selection_default_account:
Message|contains:
- 'admin'
- 'cisco'
condition: selection_default_user and selection_default_account
falsepositives:
- An intentionally retained default account used temporarily during initial device staging before hardening will also match.
level: high
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
title: "T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts"
id: 853a2838-a937-4db2-8429-caf6a5d0b20c
description: 'Detection of Default Account Abuse Across Platforms. (Retargeted to the process_creation ESXi telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: AccountName, IPRange.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-04-07
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.001
logsource:
product: esxi
service: auth
detection:
selection:
Message|contains: 'root'
selection_login:
Message|contains: 'Accepted password'
condition: selection and selection_login
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative use of the built-in root account for emergency access when Active Directory authentication is unavailable will also match; source IP text parsing in auth.log is inconsistent across ESXi versions so IP-based allowlisting is only partially reliable.
level: high
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