T1078.003 — Local Accounts
Tactics: Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access · Platforms: Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system…
Sub-technique of Valid Accounts (T1078).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
title: "T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts"
id: 0b2334e5-bc4a-4cff-8476-9732ca889d27
description: 'Detection of Local Account Abuse for Initial Access and Persistence. (Data Component: Logon Session Creation; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: TimeWindow, UserContext.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-01-03
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- '4624'
- '4648'
selection_local_account:
TargetDomainName|fieldref: ComputerName
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and selection_local_account and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- System and service accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) performing the same action are excluded via filter_system_account; tune further with process/path allowlists if noise remains.
level: medium
T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
title: "T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts"
id: bed21232-64d2-4d46-ba58-1d98c8a3ebb7
description: 'Detection of Local Account Abuse for Initial Access and Persistence. (Narrowed from raw USER_LOGIN success, which matched essentially every login regardless of authentication source, to logins specifically authenticated against the local Unix password database (pam_unix) and not via a centralized identity backend (SSSD/Kerberos/LDAP) -- since T1078.003 is specifically about local, non-domain accounts. Still requires TimeWindow/HostRole tuning to separate abuse from routine local admin access.) Tune using: TimeWindow, HostRole.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-13
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.003
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
type: USER_LOGIN
res: success
selection_local_auth:
grantors|contains: 'pam_unix'
filter_domain_auth:
grantors|contains:
- 'pam_sss'
- 'pam_krb5'
- 'pam_ldap'
condition: selection and selection_local_auth and not filter_domain_auth
falsepositives:
- Local account logons authenticated via pam_unix happen constantly for legitimate console/SSH admin access on hosts without centralized identity; this rule is intentionally still broad and needs off-hours/host-role tuning to be actionable.
level: low
T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
title: "T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts"
id: dc3ccb14-3e8d-4d9e-bded-e32e8d56e757
description: 'Detection of Local Account Abuse for Initial Access and Persistence. (Retargeted to the process_creation macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: UserContext, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-06-01
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '/sshd'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/zsh'
User|contains: 'admin'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate remote administration via SSH to local admin accounts for scheduled maintenance windows.
level: medium
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