T1090.001 — Internal Proxy
Tactic: Command and Control · Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to…
Sub-technique of Proxy (T1090).
Sigma detection rules (5)
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
title: "T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy"
id: eb3e2a91-f639-4c5c-9873-c573bc425b83
description: 'Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay. (Data Component: Network Connection Creation; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: InternalConnectionPattern, DestinationPort, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-10
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID: 3
selection_internal_dest:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
selection_relay_indicators:
- DestinationPort:
- 445
- 135
- 139
- Image|endswith:
- '\htran.exe'
- '\zxproxy.exe'
- '\zxportmap.exe'
- '\plink.exe'
- '\chisel.exe'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and selection_internal_dest and selection_relay_indicators and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Legitimate internal SMB/RPC (445/135/139) administrative traffic and authorized use of SSH/tunneling tools between internal hosts; system and service accounts are excluded via filter_system_account. Tune further with host-pair allowlists if noise remains.
level: medium
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
title: "T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy"
id: 793219ff-321d-4031-b9ec-b920ccbee555
description: 'Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay. (Retargeted to the process_creation auditd telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: UserContext, PortRange, ProcessPattern.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-04-26
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/ssh'
a1|contains: '-D'
selection_socat:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/socat'
a1|contains: 'TCP-LISTEN'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Internal SOCKS/relay proxying via ssh -D or socat listeners is a normal developer workflow; port-range and user-context tuning must be applied SIEM-side.
level: low
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
title: "T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy"
id: ec0d4d98-50d9-4d47-b8ac-510dfb7839e0
description: 'Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay. (Retargeted to the process_creation macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: LaunchAgentPath, PortBindings, AppleScriptUsage.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-01-20
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/ssh'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-D '
- '127.0.0.1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Internal SOCKS tunneling for approved remote development environments creates the same pattern.
level: medium
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
title: "T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy"
id: fc8ce995-f337-4635-85ce-e8f7b3869fa1
description: 'Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay. (Data Component: Firewall Rule Modification; baseline tier: fallback.) Tune using: ProxyTarget, ConfigChangeUser, FlowThreshold.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-17
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
product: nsm
service: firewall
detection:
selection:
action: 'allow'
app:
- 'proxy'
- 'socks'
src_ip|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
dst_ip|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Sanctioned internal proxy servers or caching appliances that legitimately relay traffic between internal network segments.
level: medium
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
title: "T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy"
id: 5824adff-03ff-4545-bf98-5030313e800e
description: 'Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay. (Retargeted to the process_creation ESXi telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: CLICommandPattern, VMInitiator, ConnectionDirectionality.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-04-05
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
product: esxi
service: shell
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: 'ssh -L'
selection_internal:
CommandLine|re: '-L\s*\d+:(10\.|172\.1[6-9]\.|172\.2[0-9]\.|172\.3[0-1]\.|192\.168\.)'
condition: selection and selection_internal
falsepositives:
- Administrators forwarding management ports to other internal hosts for troubleshooting will also match this pattern.
level: medium
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