T1176.002 — IDE Extensions
Tactic: Persistence · Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Adversaries may abuse an integrated development environment (IDE) extension to establish persistent access to victim systems. IDEs such as Visual Studio Code, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse support extensions - software components that add features like code linting, auto-completion, task automation,…
Sub-technique of Software Extensions (T1176).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions
title: "T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions"
id: 9ad5c873-eaf2-42a6-8243-3f6e91d76978
description: 'Detects command-line installation or removal of Visual Studio Code / Visual Studio extensions via --install-extension/--uninstall-extension flags, the primary Windows-observable proxy for delivery of a malicious IDE extension; side-loaded extensions that bypass the CLI are not reliably observable via Sysmon process telemetry alone. Tune using: IDEList, SuspiciousCLI, ServerZones, AllowedHosts, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-03-18
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1176.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\Code.exe'
- '\Code - Insiders.exe'
- '\devenv.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '--install-extension'
- '--uninstall-extension'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Legitimate developer installation of trusted extensions via the command line; verify the extension publisher/ID against an allowlist.
level: medium
T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions
title: "T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions"
id: cf0a29c3-cbb7-4195-89ab-e67458159063
description: 'Detect malicious IDE extension install/usage, VS Code Remote-SSH tunnel establishment (IDE Tunneling), and equivalent plugin-install CLI invocations for IntelliJ and Eclipse. (Retargeted to the process_creation auditd telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: IDEPaths, DomainAllowlist, UserRoleScope, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-03-28
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1176.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_vscode_install:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/code'
a1: '--install-extension'
selection_vscode_tunnel:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/code'
a1: 'tunnel'
selection_intellij_install:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith:
- '/idea.sh'
- '/idea'
a1|contains: 'installPlugins'
selection_eclipse_install:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/eclipse'
a1: '-application'
a2: 'org.eclipse.equinox.p2.director'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Developers legitimately install VS Code/IntelliJ/Eclipse extensions and use VS Code Remote-SSH tunnels for remote development constantly; scope to extension IDs outside an approved allow-list, non-developer user roles, and unexpected tunnel establishment outside change windows.
level: low
T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions
title: "T1176.002 Software Extensions: IDE Extensions"
id: 7107326b-899e-4c8d-a863-20fa6bb6a6dd
description: 'Detect malicious IDE extension install/usage and IDE tunneling. (Retargeted to the file_event macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: PlistLocations, MDMProfiles, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-03-10
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1176.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: macos
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '/Library/Managed Preferences/'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.mobileconfig'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate MDM-pushed configuration profiles for approved extensions create identical file artifacts.
level: medium
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