T1542.002 — Component Firmware
Tactics: Stealth, Persistence · Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS
Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be…
Sub-technique of Pre-OS Boot (T1542).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
title: "T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware"
id: cd452b46-c2d6-4eb0-bea9-58f982ec741a
description: 'Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware. (Data Component: Driver Load; baseline tier: windows-eventid.) Tune using: KnownGoodFirmwareHashes, DriverAllowList, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-29
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1542.002
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID: '6'
filter_signed:
Signed: 'true'
condition: selection and not filter_signed
falsepositives:
- Legitimately signed but unrecognized/newly-issued vendor drivers will still match since only signature presence is checked, not a specific allowlist; tune further with KnownGoodFirmwareHashes/DriverAllowList for recurring unsigned drivers already vetted in your environment.
level: medium
T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
title: "T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware"
id: 6e1a458c-9d0d-4e5f-addf-d5df80aff483
description: 'Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware, now scoped to write/flash actions (flashrom -w, fwupdate --apply, fwupdmgr update/install) instead of any invocation of these tools, so read-only firmware dumps (e.g. flashrom -r) no longer alert; severity lowered from critical to high to match confirmed-write-without-baseline-comparison confidence. (Retargeted to the process_creation auditd telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: FirmwareImageBaseline, AlertThresholds.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-03
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1542.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_flashrom_write:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/flashrom'
a1|contains: '-w'
selection_fwupdate_apply:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/fwupdate'
a1|contains: 'apply'
selection_fwupdmgr_write:
type: EXECVE
a0|endswith: '/fwupdmgr'
a1:
- 'update'
- 'install'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate firmware update tooling used by IT during patch cycles; FirmwareImageBaseline hash comparison against a known-good image is not something process telemetry can perform and needs an external integrity tool.
level: high
T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
title: "T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware"
id: a16efab7-932f-4aae-8142-f8b3b2866211
description: 'Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware. (Retargeted to the process_creation macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: ApprovedKextList, EFIHashBaseline.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-05-24
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1542.002
logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/eficheck'
- '/firmwarepasswd'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- EFI hash baseline comparisons and firmware password checks are surfaced by eficheck and firmwarepasswd but genuine EFI hash mismatches from unauthorized kext or component firmware writes cannot be reliably distinguished from a legitimate Apple firmware update from process telemetry alone; treat any eficheck anomaly report as requiring manual hash validation.
level: critical
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