T1553.006 — Code Signing Policy Modification
Tactic: Defense Impairment · Platforms: macOS, Windows
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure…
Sub-technique of Subvert Trust Controls (T1553).
Sigma detection rules (2)
T1553.006 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification
title: "T1553.006 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification"
id: 853ca3f8-f311-4d44-a5a5-0a9b0055aced
description: 'Detect Code Signing Policy Modification (Windows & macOS). (Retargeted to Sysmon EventID matching process_creation telemetry for reliable field coverage.) Tune using: MonitoredExecutables, RegistryPaths, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-03-19
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1553.006
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'set'
- 'testsigning'
- 'on'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate driver-development/testing on developer workstations; essentially never legitimate on standard production endpoints.
level: critical
T1553.006 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification
title: "T1553.006 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification"
id: eaecba54-8a80-4f61-a78a-a96f0c6f8699
description: 'Detect Code Signing Policy Modification (Windows & macOS). (Retargeted to the file_change macOS unified-log telemetry that actually captures this techniques behavior; see logsource below.) Tune using: PolicyPaths, AllowedUsers, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-25
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1553.006
logsource:
category: file_change
product: macos
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/'
- '/Library/Preferences/com.apple.security'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate MDM security policy pushes and Apple system updates modify the same SystemPolicyConfiguration database, so a file_change event alone cannot confirm an unauthorized code signing policy change without knowing the modifying process was not syspolicyd or a management agent, and there is no true registry_set equivalent on macOS so this indicator is only an approximation.
level: high
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