Tactic: Collection · Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of…
Sub-technique of Archive Collected Data (T1560).
Sigma detection rules (3)
T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method
title: "T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method"
id: f914d03f-e222-4a3e-84ef-8bee5f91bdbe
description: 'Detects scripting engines (PowerShell, WScript/CScript, Python, cmd) writing files with non-standard archive/staging extensions (.bin, .dat, .enc, .xor, .b64) - a proxy for custom (non-library) archive/encryption methods used prior to exfiltration, since content-level entropy/compression cannot be evaluated from Sigma event fields alone. (Data Component: File Creation.) Tune using: ExtensionList, TrustedScriptPaths, TimeWindow.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-02-28
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.003
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 11
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\python.exe'
- '\python3.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bin'
- '.dat'
- '.enc'
- '.xor'
- '.b64'
filter_system_account:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection and not filter_system_account
falsepositives:
- Legitimate scripts that write .dat/.bin configuration or cache files; tune extension list and script paths to the environment.
level: medium
T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method
title: "T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method"
id: e66cbd48-3fc9-4400-8196-8859eb502a54
description: 'Detect Archiving via Custom Method (T1560.003). The original rule matched openssl enc -aes (a standard utility/library) and base64 (not archival at all), the opposite of a "custom method with no external library reference". A genuinely custom in-process XOR/stream-cipher routine leaves no distinguishing argv signature and cannot be reliably observed via auditd process-creation telemetry alone; this rule instead implements the closest defensible Linux-observable proxy: execution of binaries/scripts staged from world-writable temp directories or run as hidden dotfiles, which is common for adversary-supplied custom tooling. Tune using: ArchivePaths, ScriptAllowlist.'
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
author: Shahrukh Khan
date: 2026-01-17
license: MIT
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_susp_tmp_exec:
type: EXECVE
a0|re: '^(/tmp|/dev/shm|/var/tmp)/[^/]+